曾担任央行货币政策委员会委员的余永定在《世界报业辛迪加》(Project Syndicate)发表了一篇名为《人民币触底》的文章，文章称即使人民币确实要经历一个两位数的贬值，中国也不会卷入金融危机中。毕竟，中国的公司外债并不多；中国各银行的货币错配也不多；通货膨胀率仅略高于1%。为了加强金融缓冲，中国必须更加严格地执行现有的资本管制。

中国人民银行面临窘境，中国人民银行在过去将近10年努力遏制人民币的持续升值预期（由中国的现金储备和资本账户余额引起的），最终在2014年第一季度获得成功，即强有力的市场干预将人民币汇率降低以抑制套利交易。但是，如今，中国人民银行面临着一个前所未有的挑战，看似不可逆转的贬值预期破坏了经济稳定性，此时中国承受额外不稳定性的能力最差。

由于2014年的市场干预伴随着中国经济基础的弱化，最终人民币贬值一发不可收拾。人民币不但没有提供可靠的力量抵抗汇率升值的压力，反而像早有计划一样引发了一场彻底逆转，即贬值预期开始蔓延至外汇市场。

因此，在2014年第二季度，中国的资本账户十年来首次出现赤字。截止到2015年第一季度，该赤字超过了抵消现金账户的数目，这意味着中国近年来首次跨入国际收支赤字领域。

虽然如此，考虑到中国外汇储备的规模，市场仍然有信心人民银行能够解决人民币汇率问题，使其达到期望的水平，不管中国的外部收支处于何种状况。因此，贬值预期并不强。

去年8月，人民银行将人民币汇率中间价降低1.9%，此举也许是对国际货币基金组织报告的回应，该报告鼓励中国将汇率中间价与市场利率持平。这一做法也扰乱了市场，加强了贬值预期。人民银行迅速介入，力图抑制贬值，避免引起恐慌，但是为时太晚：人民币进一步贬值的预期在市场上站稳了脚跟。

贬值预期引起越来越多的资金流出中国，因此贬值压力加强，人民银行则继续干预外汇市场，且通常以一种不可预知的方式（为了抑制投机）。因此，人民银行实际上采取爬行钉住汇率制。

尽管爬行钉住汇率制可以消除短期贬值预期，从而减少相关的资本外流，但是它无法在更远的未来消除贬值预期，更不必说减少与贬值预期不相关的资本外流。实际上，爬行钉住汇率制鼓励某些资本的外流，比如套利交易平仓，家庭账户的美元化，以及投资组合的撤离。同时，中国经济的基本面继续恶化。

所有这些已近迫使人民银行花费了大量外汇储备——仅2015年就超过5000亿美元——目的使人民币对美元保持在5%以内。以这个比例来看，那些辛苦赚来的外汇储备很快就会被用尽。这可不是办法。

意识到目前的挑战，人民银行从11份开始允许人民币以缓慢但平稳的速度下跌。但是，尽管这一“隐形贬值”起了一定作用，但是市场参与者决定在今年年初抛售他们手中的人民币。

人民银行如今有三种选择：或者停止所有的干预，允许人民币自由浮动；人民币将参照一篮子货币计划；或者将人民币严格与美元挂钩，正如1997年亚洲金融危机时的做法。但是，截止到目前，人民银行并没有迹象表明任何计划，除了当前人民币持续性政策的延续。

依我之见，人民银行应该加强中国政府以市场为导向的改革计划，并允许人民币自由浮动。中国仍然保持大量的现金账户余额和长期的资本账户余额，并没有完全开放的资本账户；所以人民币很有可能不会下降太多，持续时间不会太久，这是一个好消息。

而且，即使人民币确实要经历一个两位数的贬值，中国也不会卷入金融危机中。毕竟，中国的公司外债并不多；中国各银行的货币错配也不多；通货膨胀率仅略高于1%。为了加强金融缓冲，中国必须更加严格地执行现有的资本管制。

尽管如此，但是还有可能引起市场恐慌，同时伴随着每个小事件引起的不确定性。鉴于这种情况，人民银行可以规划一个过渡时期，在此过渡期，人民币盯住一篮子货币，合理的汇率中间价和波动范围为7.5%到15%。人民银行可以选择不宣布人民币浮动范围，因此投资者可以在人民币真正跌底之前开始购买外汇，从而在中国人民银行被动运用大量外储之前稳定汇率。

今年对于中国来说是困难的一年。但是情况远非那么可怕。如果有合适的政策组合，中国应该可以稳定人民币汇率和其外汇储备地位，并且恢复到可持续增长的道路。

原文如下：A Floor for the Renminbi

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC)faces a dilemma. After nearly a decade of trying to curb expectations ofcontinued currency appreciation (spurred by China’s current- andcapital-account surpluses), it finally succeeded in the first quarter of 2014,when its forceful market intervention drove down the renminbi’s exchange rateto discourage carry trades. Now, however, the PBOC is facing an even moredifficult challenge, as seemingly irreversible depreciation expectationsundermine economic stability at a moment whenChinacan least afford additionaluncertainty.

Because the 2014 intervention coincidedwith the weakening of China’s economic fundamentals, it ultimately amounted topushing on an opening door. Instead of providing credible resistance to upwardpressure on the exchange rate, as intended, it triggered an outright reversal,with depreciation expectations beginning to creep into foreign-exchangemarkets.

Thus, in the second quarter of 2014, Chinarecorded a capital-account deficit for the first time in decades. And by thefirst quarter of 2015, that deficit more than offset the current-accountsurplus, meaning thatChinaregistered its first internationalbalance-of-payments deficit in recent memory.

Nonetheless, given the size of China’s foreign-exchangereserves, markets remained confident that the PBOC could fix the renminbiexchange rate at whatever level it wanted, regardless of China’s externalbalance-of-payments position. As a result, depreciation expectations were notstrong.

Then, last August, the PBOC lowered therenminbi central parity rate by 1.9%, perhaps in response to an InternationalMonetary Fund report encouragingChina to align the parity rate more closely with the market rate. The moveroiled markets and intensified depreciation expectations. The PBOC quicklyintervened to avert a panic by halting the depreciation, but it was too late:expectations of further renminbi weakening became firmly established in themarket.

As these expectations drive an increasingamount of capital out of China, thereby intensifying depreciation pressure, thePBOC continues to intervene in the foreign-exchange market, often inunpredictable ways (in order to discourage speculation). As a result, the PBOChas de facto adopted a crawling-peg exchange-rate regime.

While a crawling-peg system can eliminateshort-term depreciation expectations, thereby reducing the associated capitaloutflows, it cannot eliminate depreciation expectations in the more distantfuture, let alone reduce capital outflows unrelated to depreciationexpectations. In fact, the crawling peg encourages some kinds of capitaloutflows, such as carry trade unwinding, the dollarization of household accounts,and withdrawal by portfolio investors. Meanwhile, China’s economic fundamentalscontinue to worsen.

All of this has forced the PBOC to spend ahuge amount of China’s foreign-exchange reserves – more than $500 billion in2015 alone – to keep the level of renminbi depreciation vis-à-vis the US dollarwithin 5%. At this rate, those hard-earned foreign-exchange reserves will soonbe exhausted. That is not an option.

Recognizing the challenge at hand, the PBOChas been allowing the renminbi to fall, slowly but surely, since November. Butwhile this “stealth devaluation” worked for a while, market participantsdecided at the beginning of this year to dump their renminbi again.

The PBOC now has three options: it can stopall interventions and let the renminbi float; link it to a basket ofcurrencies; or peg it tightly to the US dollar, as it did during the Asianfinancial crisis of 1997. So far, however, the PBOC has offered no indicationof its plans, beyond the continuation of its current renminbi-sustainingpolicy.

In my opinion, the PBOC should reinforcethe Chinese government’s market-oriented reform plans and allow the renminbi tofloat.Chinais still running a large current-account surplus and a long-termcapital-account surplus, and it has not fully liberalized its capital account;so the chances are good that the renminbi would not fall too far or for toolong.

Moreover, even if the renminbi didexperience a double-digit depreciation,Chinawould not be thrust intofinancial crisis. After all, the country’s stock of corporate external debt isnot too large; the currency mismatch within Chinese banks is small; andinflation is just above 1%. To bolster such financial buffers,Chinamustenforce existing capital controls much more strictly.

Nonetheless, there remains the possibilityof a market panic, with all of the uncertainty that such an episode implies.Given this, the PBOC could engineer a transition during which the renminbi ispegged to a basket of currencies, with an adjustable central parity rate and awide fluctuation band of 7.5% or even 15%. It could choose not to announce the(very wide) fluctuation band, so that investors, judging that the renminbi hadfallen far enough, might begin to purchase the currency before it actuallyreached the floor, thereby stabilizing the exchange rate before the PBOC wasforced to spend more foreign-exchange reserves.

This year will be another difficult one forChina. But the situation is far from dire. With the right policy mix, Chinashould be able to stabilize its currency and foreign-reserve position, andreturn to a sustainable growth path.